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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate whether the presence of private insurance leads to improved health
status. Using the Health and Retirement study we focus on adults in late middle age who are nearing
entry into Medicare. Estimation addresses endogeneity of the insurance participation decision in
health outcome regressions. Two models are tested, an instrumental variables models, and a model
with endogenous treatment effects due to Heckman (1978). Insurance participation and health
behaviors enter with a lag to allow their effects to dissipate over time. Separate regressions were run
for groupings of chronic conditions. We find that the overall impact of insurance on health tends to
be significantly downwards biased if no adjustment for endogeneity is made. With corrections there
is a four-fold increase in the insurance effect; yielding a 7 percent increase in the overall health
measure for the uninsured. Results are consistent across IV and treatment effects models, and for
all major groupings of medical conditions. Thus, the effect of private insurance on health may be
larger than previously estimated. As for policy, expanding coverage to the uninsured should result
in substantial health improvement. By conjecture, this is likely to reduce the need for health care
when individuals retire and enter Medicare, potentially leading to savings.
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1.  Background  
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, approximately 40 million Americans are 
uninsured and this number is expected to grow in coming years.  Although the Clinton 
administration was forced to retreat from some ambitious goals for expanding coverage, 
providing access to the insured is emerging again as major public policy issue. (Winslow 
and McGinley, 2000).  Health benefits in the U.S. remain heavily employer-based with 
about 60 percent of all insured individuals being enrolled through employer-sponsored 
plans. (Acs et al., 1996). While the indigent can often qualify for public assistance 
programs such as Medicaid, many participants in the labor force may not have adequate 
access to coverage through their employer. Although it is possible to purchase individual 
plans privately, these may only be available at prohibitively high rates compared with the 
group rates available through large employers. As a consequence, 16% of full time 
workers are uninsured (Custer and Ketche 2000).   
Not surprisingly, much of the policy discussion focuses on ways of expanding 
coverage to all workers. Two competing approaches have been offered. One approach 
favors expanding employer-based coverage and making it easier for firms to purchase 
insurance for their employees (Gruber, 2001). Another approach favors providing 
stronger incentives for purchasing insurance directly to employees. A prime example of 
the former was the Clinton health care reform plan, which would have allowed small 
firms to purchase health care insurance at competitive group rates through large 
purchasing cooperatives (Cutler, 1994). Recently, the Bush administration proposed a tax 
credit of up to $1,000 to help low income workers purchase insurance for their families 
(Gleckman, 2002). Several other proposals would go further in severing the link between   2
employment and health insurance but move towards mandated universal coverage 
(Blendon, Young, DeRoches, 1999).   
  Both sides of the debate seem to implicitly be making the assumption that 
expanding coverage will lead to gains in social welfare. This can occur in two ways: first, 
by reducing uncertainty for workers and their families, and second, by improving access 
to medical services and thereby improving health outcomes. Our primary interest is in the 
latter question, i.e. in determining the impact of insurance on overall health. 
  Recent studies have tended to focus on mortality, rather than health per se, finding 
that adults without health insurance have higher mortality than individuals with private 
insurance (Franks, Clancy, and Gold, 1993; Sorlie et al. 1994).  Looking at similar 
populations, other studies focused on the effect of lack of private insurance on health 
measures such as physical limitations (Baker et al., 2001, Ross and Mirowsky, 2000).  In 
all of these studies the insurance effects were either small or insignificant. However, none 
of these studies addressed one important estimation issue, namely endogeneity of the 
insurance choice variable in the health equation.  This potential bias arises if healthier 
people exhibit behaviors that will make them more (or less) likely to purchase insurance 
(Gruber et al., 2000).  The only study to address this issue explicitly addressed is limited 
to a specific population, that of HIV-positive individuals (Goldman et al., 2001).  That 
study demonstrated that accounting for the endogeneity in insurance results in a dramatic 
and statistically significant increase in the effect of insurance on declines in mortality 
probabilities.   
In this study we study we reexamine the endogeneity in a different context. We 
employ the same sample of middle-aged labor force participants in the Health and 
Retirement Survey used recently by Baker et al. (2001), but we use a broader measure of   3
individual health status. We address the endogeneity issue in the context of a treatment 
effects model.  Our results confirm the direction of the effects found in Baker et al., 
namely that having insurance leads to better health status. However, we also found that 
failure to account for endogeneity bias results in underestimating the full effect of 
insurance. In this respect our results are also in agreement with Goldman et al. (2001.)  
  The fundamental question we aim to address is as follows: will improved access 
to private health insurance in and of itself lead to better health outcomes?  Evidence to 
this effect may provide further support in favor of policies designed to expand health 
insurance coverage, irrespective of the policy mechanism ultimately chosen. The plan of 
the paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature on the measurement 
and determination of health, as well as insurance choice. Section 3 presents the 
methodological approach and estimation framework. Section 4 presents data and variable 
definitions. Section 5 presents results from the insurance participation equation and the 
health status equation for the full sample. In addition it summarizes results from a 
number of tests for endogeneity bias, along with the magnitude of the bias. Section 6 
replicates this analysis for subsets of survey respondents based on groupings of chronic 
conditions. This was done in order to test whether insurance effects are repeated across 
various settings in which symptoms of the underlying medical condition may not be 
equally observable to the individual. Finally, implications of the results are discussed in 
Section 7.  
 
2.  Previous Literature 
A number of separate themes in the literature are relevant to this study. Among 
these are the use of physical health measures derived from household surveys; effect of   4
insurance on health, including the endogeneity bias that arises in estimation; the relative 
importance of the effects of health behaviors and insurance on health; and the probability 
of having insurance. We briefly review each one of them, and explain how they are 
connected in relation to the research question in this paper. 
Health measures: 
There is a substantial body of literature on using survey-based measures of health 
status. These measures appear with similar wording in major household surveys such as 
the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), the Health and Retirement Survey, and 
the National Health Interview Survey.  Indicators are generally classified into three types: 
Subjective measure, i.e. self rated overall health (poor, fair, good, very, excellent), 
objective measures based on a general criterion, especially physical limitation, defined as 
inability to perform certain tasks defined in the survey, and objective measures that 
pertain to self–reporting of specific diagnoses or medical conditions. In general, these 
measures have been shown to perform well. Perry and Rosen (2001) find that “objective 
measures give exactly the same answer as subjective measures” (p.19) when testing for 
differences in health status between wage earners and the self employed. Specifically in 
the Health and Retirement Study, Hurd and McGarry (1995) find that subjective 
probabilities of survival vary with health predictors in the same way as actual outcomes. 
By combining the variety of self-reported conditions into a single index the 
Medical Outcomes Study produced a health status measure that minimizes individual 
error (Ware and Sherborn, 1992, Ware et al., 1995). The index, known as the Short-Form 
36 (SF-36), utilizes the same indicators of physical health as those found in large 
household surveys.  The index avoids the use of self-reports on specific diagnoses, which 
have been shown to be sensitive to false negative errors in Canadian data (Baker, Stabile,   5
and Deri, 2001). Variables in the Health and Retirement Study render themselves to a 
very close approximation of the SF-36 (Baker et al., 2001, 2000), since it includes the 
same basic groupings of health indicators. Differences are found in the wording used to 
describe certain physical limitations or conditions. In section 4 we provide further detail 
regarding construction of this variable in the HRS  
Effect of insurance on health:  
A number of recent studies have attempted to estimate the effect of insurance on 
health, but the results appear to be inconclusive. For working age adults, people without 
health insurance tend to have higher mortality probabilities than individuals with private 
insurance (Franks, Clancy, and Gold, 1993; Sorlie et al., 1994). Smaller effects were 
found for populations with particular diagnoses such as breast cancer in women (Ayanian 
et al., 1993). In at least one population, that of HIV-positive individuals, the effect of 
insurance on mortality probabilities turns out to be substantially larger after accounting 
for endogeneity of insurance in the mortality equation. However, in the case of public 
insurance programs such as Medicare or Medicaid, only weak effects of insurance on 
adult mortality or infant mortality were found (Sorlie et al., 1994; Kaestner, Joyce, and 
Racine, 1999). 
Other related studies focused on health status, rather than mortality, as measured 
by self reported health, physical limitations, and presence of selected medical conditions.  
Ross and Mirowski (2000) find no significant effects of private or public health insurance 
on health outcomes. Perry and Rosen attempt to measure insurance effects by comparing 
two populations with different levels of coverage, namely wage earners and the self-
employed. They conclude that the relative lack of insurance among the self-employed has 
little to no impact on their health as measured by the presence of medical conditions. On   6
the other hand, Baker et al. (2001) finds small but positive and significant effects of 
private insurance on self-reported health and physical functioning for working age adults, 
after allowing for appropriate lags. Again, the endogeneity issue was not explicitly 
addressed in any of these studies. 
  Relative effects of health behaviors and insurance on health: 
A more ‘established’ strain in the literature focuses on the role of human capital.  
The Grossman model (1972a, 1972b) defined a health production function, in which 
investments in health care including medical care and home activities exhibit diminishing 
marginal productivity in maintaining health.  The Grossman model also predicts that 
education increases the efficiency of investment (MEI) across the board, i.e. it shifts the 
MEI schedule to right.  In a study based on the National Health Interview Survey, Kenkel 
(1991) finds evidence to support this, showing a positive correlation between schooling 
and health augmenting behaviors.  It has been suggested that health behaviors may 
ultimately be more important than the purchase of medical services (Fuchs, 1998).   
‘Offer’ versus ‘take up’ decisions: 
More recent research has focus on the likelihood of the firm offering insurance to 
its employees, namely the offer probability of insurance. An extensive summary of 
results can be found in Gruber 2001, who emphasizes the importance of tax rates on the 
offer probability, with elasticities ranging from –0.1 to –0.6. Bundorff (2002) examined 
the effect of employee preference and worker characteristics on the offer probability, and 
found only small effects. Using data centered on firms that provide insurance coverage 
Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) show that employees take up probabilities are 
sensitive to premium levels. Generally, take up probabilities are conditional on the 
employer actually offering insurance. However, surveys of households and workers tend   7
to provide limited information on employers, leading to studies that incorporate 
individual characteristics, while necessarily omitting firm-level variables (e.g., Simon, 
2001). 
 
3. Methodological Approach 
Addressing the endogeneity issue requires creating an instrument for insurance 
participation in the health status equation. To meet identification requirements Goldman 
et al. used state-level policy variables as predictors of insurance, noting that these 
variables would be correlated with insurance availability via Medicaid for AIDS patients 
while being uncorrelated with health. Unfortunately, the Health and Retirement Study 
does not provide any geographic information, including state of residence in the U.S due 
to strict confidentiality requirements. However, given our focus on private insurance 
markets, we are aided by the notion the worker’s decision to take up insurance is 
conditional on the employer’s offer. Thus the identification problem becomes one of 
finding instrumental variables that predict the likelihood that an employer offers 
insurance without being correlated with health status. As we explain later we use a series 
of Wald-tests to make sure that our instruments are valid. We are also aided by the fact 
that following Baker et al. (2001) insurance participation enters the health equation with a 
lag, although this provides a weaker source of identification.   
We estimate the following system of equations:  
Ht   = H (Xt-k, Bt-k, It-k, Ht-k)              [1] 
 It-k  = I (Xt-k, Ft-k).                [2] 
Where H = health index in period t, X = socioeconomic characteristics, B = health 
indicators and behavioral variables.  I = binary indicator of insurance, and F = firm or job   8
characteristics that predict the likelihood of insurance being offered. Finally k denotes the 
length of the lag.  Equation [1] defines the health “production function” (Grossman, 
1972, 1976), while Equation [2] is used to predict the likelihood of having insurance.  
Equation [2] is the indicator function for purchasing insurance, which can be estimated as 
a probabilistic model. The decision to purchase insurance is an individual decision, but is 
conditioned on the employer offering insurance. Most household surveys, including the 
HRS, do not contain variables that provide this information directly. However, other 
characteristics of the firm and certain job characteristics serve as indicators of the 
propensity of the firm to offer insurance benefits. These characteristics are contained in 
the vector Ft-k. While interesting issues arise in conjunction with the insurance decision, 
our main interest in creating a well-identified instrument. Thus the specification of the 
probability equation is incidental to our main research question.   
The lag structure is used in equation [1] to allow for the fact that adjustment to 
behavioral covariates does not occur instantaneously. For instance, smoking and alcohol 
abuse require some passage of time before causing adverse health effects
1.  The same can 
be assumed for health insurance. Including the lagged dependent variable, Ht-k, is 
consistent with the Grossman investment model, which states that current health depends 
on the initial level of health. For convenience, the lag is also applied to time invariant 
demographic characteristics such as gender, race, and marital status. 
                                                 
1  Lags considered in related seminal medical studies on the effects of smoking, physical activity 
and alcohol consumption drinking range from one year to a decade, e.g. Frank et al., 1966; 
LaCroix et al., 1991; Thun et al., 1997.  
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  Although this model can be rewritten in the form of a change equation,
2 in our 
particular case we will stop short of interpreting it as such due to a definitional change 
between in health variables that occurred between the 1992 and 1996 waves of the HRS. 
In 1996 HRS introduced a change in the phrasing of responses to a small subset of 
questions that make up the indicators of the health index. This caused a slight upward 
‘’creep’’ in the index. As a result, for some observations health status would appear to 
artificially increase over time. However, this does not affect the distribution of health 
status within each wave. Thus the 1992 index provides a reasonable baseline measure of 
health status, with slightly altered scaling. Note that we are not interested in the 
magnitude of change in health status per se, but rather in the effect of insurance 
participation, holding everything else constant. More detail on the construction of the 
health index is provided in Section 4.  
  Lagging the effects of health inputs and insurance gives the empirical model its 
recursive structure. Nevertheless, the two equations may not be independent and the error 
terms associated with equation [1] and [2] may be correlated if there is some unobserved 
trait that makes people who purchase insurance more or less likely to be healthy in a 
future period. For instance, if insurance is positively correlated with an unobserved trait, 
say ‘awareness’ and this trait also leads a person to take better care of his health, then the 
error terms would be positively correlated. In this case the coefficient of insurance in the 
                                                 
2  To this, we first write the health equation in the following form:  
Ht = b0  + b1Yt-k + (1-d)Ht-k, 
Where Y is a vector of insurance and other variables related to health behaviors, and d is the rate 
of depreciation of health stock. Rewriting we get:  
Ht - Ht-k, = b0  + b1Yt-k -dHt-k , where d ‡ 0.  
The coefficients can be alternatively interpreted as being generated by distributed lag, adaptive 
expectations, or partial adjustment processes (Maddala, 1980), but these are difficult to 
distinguish and not relevant to our discussion.  
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health equation would be upward biased. If, on the other hand, insurance is positively 
correlated with an unobserved trait that also causes a person to neglect her health, e.g., 
reduce preventive effort, than error terms would be negatively correlated and the 
coefficient of insurance in the health equation would be downward biased. The final 
direction of the simultaneity bias cannot be ascertained a priori.  
To address this issue, we use a two-step procedure, whereby we initially estimate 
equation 2 to obtain the predicted value of It-k, or some related transformation (see below) 
and then substitute this predicted value, or some related transformation (see discussion 
below) into Equation [1]. Note that the model is statistically identified since the vector of 
coefficients Ft-k is included in [2] but omitted from [1]. The estimation procedure we use 
is essentially an OLS regression for Equation [2] augmented by the hazard function from 
a probit regression for [1], i.e., the  ‘treatment effects’ model, due to Heckman (1978, 
1979) and Maddala 1983. This model, often referred to as the restricted control function 
(RCF) method, is appropriate when the censoring of the non-participating group does not 
take place as it would in the standard Heckman selection model. Moreover it is at least as 
efficient as its alternative, the instrumental variable estimator (Vella and Verbeek, 1999). 
The model can be summarized as follows:  
, i i t i i i v Y bI H + + + + = l s g a e         [3] 
Where Hi is health status or some other outcome measure such as expenditures for 
individual i, Ii  is a binary indicator of being in the treatment group (in our case, =1 if 
insured, = 0 if uninsured), Y i is the vector of covariates, li is the hazard rate obtained 
from the first stage probit on the treatment indicator (e.g., if individual is insured), and ste 
is the covariance of the disturbance terms in the treatment function and the non-  11
augmented OLS equation. An algorithm by Maddala (1983, p. 122) provides adjusted 
standard errors. The estimate of ste provides a specification test for [3], with high 
statistical significance indicating that the null hypothesis (the non-augmented OLS 
equation is true), should be rejected.
 3  
  RCF is appropriate when the distribution of the dependent variable is fully 
observed, but assignment to treatment groups is non-random. Unlike the standard 
Heckman selectivity bias model, where the hazard enters in lieu of the treatment 
indicator, the RCF method includes the binary indicator in addition to the hazard rate. 
Thus, RCF allows for direct comparisons of a with the coefficient of the treatment 
indicator in a simple OLS model. Note that model [3] is very similar to a class of 
instrumental variable (IV) estimators in which the residuals from a linear probability 
regression on the indicator function are included in second stage equation in lieu of the 
hazard rate.
4  
  Choosing one model over the other entails a tradeoff between making 
distributional assumptions about the errors and attaining consistency of the structural 
parameters of interest. The RCF assumes a bivariate normal distribution of the errors in 
the first and second stage equation, but yields consistent and efficient structural 
                                                 
3  Stated differently a high correlation between regression errors indicates that endogeneity is 
present. The covariance term can be expressed in terms of the correlation: ste = ?se . All relevant 
terms are reported in the regression tables.  
 
4  The use of residuals to account for endogeneity is commonly encountered in models with 
censored endogenous regressors.  For example, Heckman (1978, 1979) adopted this approach to 
account for sample-selection bias and endogeneity bias in models in which the treatment is 
captured through an indicator function. Vella (1993) employed the same approach for a range of 
models involving selection bias or censored endogenous regressors.  Smith and Blundell (1986) 
and Rivers and Vuong (1988) adopted the same idea in accounting for endogeneity in models 
where the dependent variable is censored and the endogenous regressor is continuous. However 
corrections for standard errors have not been fully resolved. 
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parameters. In comparison, the IV model is free of distributional assumptions, but the 
estimates may be inconsistent. Vella and Verbreek (1999) show that if the normality 
assumption is satisfied, IV and RCF are identical, and they recommend comparing 
estimates from both models. Our own comparison (e.g., Table 3) indicated that the two 
models yielded virtually identical estimates. We opted to present regression results from 
RCF since it allows for a more intuitive interpretation of the participation parameter as a 
‘treatment’ or intervention and because it provided corrected standard errors. Henceforth 
we refer to this model as the ‘treatment’ model. 
Identification Strategy 
When selecting instrumental variables, we are aided by the notion that the 
employee’s decision to purchase insurance, i.e., his take-up probability, is conditioned on 
the employer’s offer.  In many large household surveys a binary indicator of the firm’s 
offer is not typically available. However, many other employer characteristics may be 
reported, and can be taken as ‘indicators’ of the propensity of the employer to provide 
insurance. In turn, this is substituted into Equation [2] to yield a predictive equation.  
Similarly, certain job characteristics such as union membership, for instance, may predict 
access to insurance coverage. Regional indicators may proxy for policies that impact 
insurance availability (States are intentionally omitted from the Health and retirement 
Study). Modeling the decision-making process in this simple way provides the necessary 
motivation for picking appropriate instrumental variables. However, as in all 
simultaneous equation estimators two important statistical issues need to be addressed. 
First, a number of studies have cautioned against using poorly fitted predictive models in 
the first-stage, as they may introduce measurement error that outweighs the benefit from 
reducing the error due to simultaneous equation bias (e.g., Bound, Jaeger, Baker, 1995;   13
Staiger and Stock, 1999). Even when model specification is guided by economic theory, a 
good fit is not guaranteed. Second, instrumental variables might themselves be correlated 
with unobservable determinants of outcome in the second stage. 
Define Equation [2] as the “insurance participation” equation, with the indicator 
variable coded as =1 if the individual has insurance and =0 if the individual does not have 
insurance, to be estimated as a probit. To address the first concern, we report goodness of 
fit measures, which are relatively high. We further performed Wald tests for the joint 
significance of our instruments and find that it is also high. Note that our interest is only 
in obtaining an instrument for the insurance decision in the second stage health status 
with variables available in the Health and Retirement Study.
5 
  Consider the instruments we picked for the insurance participation equation. We 
also included employer characteristics such as firm size and a dummy variable indicating 
if the firm offers a pension plan. The pension plan indicator is a potentially powerful 
instrumental variable, since it is known to correlate highly with other employee benefits, 
but there is no reason to assume that it is correlated with employee health. Still, we 
cannot be completely sure.  
Firm size is related to insurance coverage since large firms are better able to pool 
risks and negotiate lower premiums, but they may also attract healthier workers. We 
included job characteristics such as union membership and managerial and professional 
position that imply better access to insurance, but admittedly may also draw healthier 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, the Health and Retirement Study does not include information on insurance 
premiums, Cutler (2002) and Dana et al. (2001) propose using state level variables such as 
marginal tax rates and policy dummies, respectively, which may be uncorrelated with health but 
correlated with insurance participation. These could not be linked to our file, since states are 
intentionally omitted in that survey.  
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workers. It is possible that for the relatively older age group in question, employer and 
job characteristics have been predetermined, given that job switching for this group is a 
relatively rare phenomenon.   
  The hypothesis that an instrumental variable is uncorrelated with unobservable 
characteristics, and hence with the outcome measure itself, cannot be tested directly. To 
determine this it is only possible to perform a ‘weak test’ – by regressing the full set of 
variables including the proposed instrumental variables on outcomes in second stage 
(Goldman et al., 2001). As we later explain [section 5] this approach provided us with 
greater confidence that our assumptions are appropriate, at least for our sample of 
relatively older adults. We further report Wald tests for joint significance of instrumental 
variables in the insurance participation probits. While interesting issues arise in 
conjunction with the insurance decision itself, the results are incidental to our main 
research question. Our interest here is limited to creating a well-identified instrument in 
the health status IV and treatment effects models.  These and other variables are 
discussed below.  
 
4.  Data and Variables. 
Our data came from the Health and Retirement Study, which is a household survey of 
mostly working age adults.  As part of this survey, follow-up interviews were conducted 
every two years.  For purposes of our research we focused on wave 1 and wave 3, 
corresponding to the years 1992 and 1996. In 1992, face-to-face interviews were 
conducted for 7702 households, yielding a total of 12,652 individuals for wave 1 (1992).    
We focused our sample on adults 45-64 years old; few people below age 45 participated, 
and almost all participants age 65 and older at baseline were insured through Medicare.    15
Because we were interested in the insurance choices available to participants in the labor 
force, we also excluded a small number of Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries, and 
those enrolled through  other Federal health insurance programs(e.g., Veteran’s 
Administration, CHAMPUS).  Due to the lagged variable structure of our estimation 
procedure, we further considered only individuals who participated in both waves. This 
and a small number of omitted observations due to missing data resulted in a final sample 
size of 9,050 individuals.  
  Our main dependent variable is the health index wave 3, which is a summary 
measure of self-reported overall health, two measures of physical limitations (mobility 
and agility), and a measure of pain. All four components of this health index are coded so 
that higher values indicate better health.
6  The same structure is used to generate an 
independent health index wave 1, which provides a measure of baseline health status. The 
health index used in our analysis closely mirrors the construction of a widely used 
summary measure of physical health known as the SF-36. Examples of recent studies in 
the health care literature that have used variants of this measure in empirical work include 
Baker et al. (2001), Ware (2000), Mirowsky and Ross (1998). Indeed, regression analysis 
                                                 
6   The component items of the index are as follows: Self-reported overall health, with the options 
excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor (coded 5 = excellent to 1 = poor).  The physical mobility 
component which measures ability to perform activities requiring large muscle strength using 4 
items: walking several blocks; walking one block; climbing several flights of stairs; climbing one 
flight of stairs without resting.  The agility component measures physical activities required to 
perform instrumental activities of daily living using 6 items: sitting for about 2 hours; getting up 
from a chair after sitting for long periods; lifting weights over 10 pounds; stooping, kneeling or 
crouching; pulling/pushing a large object; and reaching/extending arms above shoulder level.  
Items were coded 1 if the respondent reported no difficulty with the activity, 0 otherwise, then 
summed for each component. The pain level measure is taken from several items in the 
questionnaire that ask respondents to characterize their pain as none, very mild, mild, moderate, 
and severe (coded from 5 to 1, respectively).  Finally, all 4 measures were summed and scaled to 
form the 100-point health index.  A test of the correlation of rankings across the various items 
indicated a very high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82).   
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on this index yields results that are consistent with some well known biological and 
behavioral phenomena (see section 5).     
  All independent variables in the health equation were taken from wave 1, i.e. as 
lagged values. This included socioeconomic variables age, gender, race, marital status, 
years of school completed, and household income (measured as the ratio of total 
household income to the official U.S. poverty line in 1991, adjusted for family size). In 
addition, they include variables that reflect past health behaviors, such as smoking, 
number of alcoholic drinks of per day, and measures of initial health stock such as the 
body-mass index  (weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared), the number 
of chronic conditions reported in HRS (including hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, 
chronic lung disease, cancer, arthritis, stroke, and visual difficulties), and finally the 
lagged health index.  Not shown in the Table 1 are the ranges of the body-mass index: 
quintile 1: 16.7 – 23.0; quintile 2 : 23.0 – 25.2;  quintile 3: 25.3 –27.4;  quintile 4: 27.4 – 
30.5; quintile 5: 30.6-50.5.  According to actuarial and epidemiological standards, 
persons are considered “overweight” if their BMI is between 25 and 30, and ‘obese’ if 
BMI > 30. Thus the third and fourth quintiles correspond to the overweight category, and 
the fifth quintile corresponds to the obesity category (see Averett and Korenman, 1996, 
for instance). 
  Between the 1992 and 1996 surveys, there was a change in wording of questions 
and response options for items in the physical difficulties subscale
7. Health is expected to 
                                                 
7  In 1992 the options for the physical difficulties in the HRS were ‘not at all difficult’ ‘a little 
difficult’, ‘somewhat difficult’, and ‘very difficult/cannot do’. In 1996 the question was rephrased 
to ‘Do you have any difficulty?’ with the responses: no; yes; cannot do.  To have consistency 
between the questions and response options in 1992 and 1996, we used a similar approach to that 
used in previous studies. (Baker et al., 2001; Clark, et al. 1998, Burchett et al., 1993): all 
questions for 1992 and 1996 were dichotomized into no difficulty (= 0) versus some difficulty (=   17
decline with time; thus the small increase in mean health index from 75. 8 to 77 reported 
in Table 1 is probably an artifact of a slight change in scaling rather than a reflection of a 
true increase in health status.  However, the distributions are similar in both waves, 
suggesting that the 1992 index provides a reasonable measure of baseline health. As can 
be seen from Appendix A, the moments of the distribution for both the insured and 
uninsured are virtually equal for both periods.  
  The main variable of interest is insurance participation. Survey respondents were 
classified as insured regardless of whether they had employer-based or individual 
policies.  In the full sample there were 7,507 individuals with any insurance policy of 
which 1,543 were uninsured.
8  The Health and Retirement Survey does not contain a 
variable indicating whether the employer actually offered health insurance to employees. 
However, several indicators for the firm’s propensity to offer such insurance are 
available. Among these are employer size, availability of other employer sponsored 
benefits such as a 401k plan (pension), and an indicator of the worker’s ability to get 
insurance through other sources, e.g. union membership.  In addition, we include a binary 
indicator of job characteristics (=1 if professional or managerial), to account for firms 
that limit health benefits to certain classes of employees. We also included a binary 
indicator of employment (6,601 individuals were on-the-job at the time of the survey). 
Thus, job and employer characteristics in the model are effectively interaction terms.  
                                                                                                                                                 
1). The absence of the option  ‘a little difficult’ in 1996 may have prompted certain respondents 
to report ‘no difficulty’, for instance. 
 
8 Individuals who said they had only minimal coverage, e.g. coverage for special conditions such 
as mental health, dental insurance, or long-term care insurance were classified as uninsured 
because these policies do not enable access to routine health care services. In the full sample, 
there were only 360 such cases.  
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Regional variables were also included in the regression, to account for differences in 
mandates and premium regulation, which vary from state to state, but are known to 
exhibit regional patterns. Detailed definitions and summary statistics are presented in 
Table 1. Summary statistics for binary indicator are the percent in the sample belonging 
to group. Means and standard deviations are reported for continuous variables. Results 
from the first stage regressions on insurance participation, and second stage regressions 
on health status are described below.   
Other regressions replicated the analysis by type of major chronic condition 
available in the Health and Retirement Survey. We designate these as follows: Population 
1, persons with no major chronic condition at all; Population 2, persons with any major 
medical conditions, i.e. heart disease, stroke, cancer, arthritis, asthma or other chronic 
lung disease, diabetes, and hypertension; Population 3, the subset of persons with 
asymptomatic conditions, i.e., conditions which may not have external symptoms in early 
stages of the disease, namely hypertension and diabetes; and finally, population 4, 
persons with hypertension, the single most common chronic condition in the population. 
Note that populations 2-4 are nested; population 4 is a subgroup of population 3, and 
population 3 is a subgroup of population 2.  In addition, this list of medical conditions is 
by no means exhaustive; other medical conditions that may be prevalent in the population 
are simply not reported for respondents in the survey.  Sample sizes for our grouping 
were 3210, 5,640, 3,598, and 3290 respectively. Further detail of definitions of medical 
conditions are reserved for Section 6.  
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5.   Results: The Full Sample 
First-stage estimates: probability of insurance participation 
Table 2 presents probit estimates on insurance participation. Two versions of the 
model are shown. The only explanatory variables included in Model 1 are predictors of 
the ‘offer’ probability for insurance.  Model 2 adds socioeconomic characteristics that are 
related the take-up decision.  Thus this model has the interpretation of a ‘take-up’ 
probability, conditional on being offered insurance by the employer. In either case are not 
interested in the insurance participation decision per se. Rather, we aim to create an 
instrument that can be incorporated into the second stage estimates of health status in 
either an IV or treatments effects setting. The two models we employ corresponds to two 
levels of identification: First, an instrument that meets identification criteria, but is more 
parsimonious; second a model that adds regressors from the second stage that have a 
theoretical meaning in the insurance decision, but are not strictly required for 
identification purposes.  The choice of the two models entails a tradeoff in terms of our 
identification strategy. The first model might allow a higher correlation of the 
instruments with treatment variable. The second model should allow for a better overall 
fit of the predictive model and is akin to a 2SLS procedure.  To help choose the better 
model we report the usual goodness of fit statistics for each model.  In addition, we report 
the Wald statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the insurance 
participation equations.  The results suggest a slight preference in favor of the second 
specification. Model 2 produces much bigger goodness of fit statistics. The Wald statistic 
is somewhat lower in this model but still highly significant. 
  Firm and job characteristics, which are assumed to be predictors of the likelihood 
of being offered insurance the yield similar effects in both models; and are highly   20
significant.  The coefficients exhibit a pattern to be expected with their interpretation as 
indicators of insurance offer. Thus union workers and employees in management or 
professional positions are more likely to have insurance compared with other employees. 
The negative coefficient of ‘employed’ indicates that employees in small firms (i.e. not of 
size category two or three) are less likely to have insurance than the unemployed. On the 
other hand employees in mid-sized and large firms are more likely to have insurance, 
with an effect that increases with the size category. These effects are to be expected given 
what is widely known about insurance offering by employers in general. In particular 
while most small firms do not offer insurance to their employees (Ginsburg and Gable, 
1996) certain employed workers continue to access to insurance, either because they are 
on public assistance programs such as SSDI, or in cases of short run employment they 
may continue to carry their old insurance policy under ERISA.  Firms that offer 401k 
plans are more likely to offer health benefits, leading to the positive coefficient of 401k in 
the regressions.  
Regional variables were included to account for mandates of minimum benefits 
and premium regulation, which vary from state to state, but are known to exhibit regional 
patterns.  The coefficients indicate that people who reside in the south and west region of 
the U.S, are less likely to have insurance than people in the northeast, while those who 
reside in the Midwest are less likely to be insured, all else being equal. 
Since results on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and health 
behaviors are incidental to our main research question, we present them only briefly. The 
coefficients indicate the likelihood of purchasing insurance increases significantly with 
age, adjusted household income level (i.e., income-to-needs quintiles) or education level. 
Black and Hispanics were less likely to have insurance, whereas married persons are   21
more likely to have insurance.  Hazard rates (l) generated from the probit model are 
included as independent variables in the health status regressions summarized in Table 4. 
The estimated coefficients of the hazard are denoted as ?te. 
Second Stage Estimates: Health Status Equations 
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 3 represent second stage estimates of ‘treatment 
effect’ models, corresponding to first stage estimates of Model 1 and 2 from the previous 
table. With some minor rounding off, the two regressions on health status yield virtually 
identical results. Thus, the discussion below applies equally to both specifications.  
 Although generally health declines with age, the lack of significance of the age 
variable here is not surprising given the narrow range of ages in our sample. While there 
is considerable discussion of health care disparities in health, racial/ethnic origin does not 
have a significant effect in our setting, probably as a result of holding socioeconomic 
status and health behaviors constant elsewhere. On the other hand, females have 
significantly lower health compared with males. As expected, there is a positive 
association between education and health, with diminishing incremental gains from one 
level of education to another. This result is consistent with the Grossman investment 
model, which predicts that an individual’s marginal efficiency in deploying medical care 
and other health inputs increases with the level of education. Increases in relative income 
operate in a similar way as increases in educational attainment. There is a positive 
association between income (relative to need) and health. Again the incremental gain of 
this effect diminishes as income level rises, and becomes negligible at the highest 
quintile.   
  Three groups of variables deal with risky health behaviors, namely smoking, 
drinking, and obesity.  Past smokers and current smokers experienced significantly lower   22
health compared with non-smokers. Moderate alcohol consumption had no significant 
adverse health effects, whereas heavy drinking did. On the other hand, obesity is a highly 
significant factor, with progressively decreasing health as body-mass quintiles move 
higher. The lagged health index, which indexes initial health stock has a significantly 
positive effect. The simple interpretation of this variable is that better health in the past 
leads to better health in the future. A further interpretation of this variable, based on 
rearranging the model to form a change equation, also suggests that it reflects the rate of 
depreciation of health stock.
9  
  Since our main research question has to do with the consequences of the lack of 
insurance, all of the preceding effects, while interesting, are essentially viewed here 
merely as controls. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that these effects conform with the 
broad literature and what is generally well known about determinants of health, further 
indicating the validity of the health index as a measure of overall healthiness. This 
increases our confidence in the main finding, namely that lack of insurance has a 
significant negative impact on health. Because a number of measurement issues arose, we 
defer to the summary of related results as presented in Table 4 and Table 5.  
Endogeneity of the insurance indicator: 
Table 4 provides a comparison of the three general types of econometric models: 
ordinary least squares, the IV estimator, and the treatment model.  The treatment model 
was previously described, but the main coefficients are included here for expositional 
                                                 
9 More explicitly, the complement of the lagged health coefficient, 1- 0.54 = 0.46 is the rate of 
depreciation, yielding a cumulative average annual rate of 0.8 percent over the observed four-year 
interval. Converted to elasticity terms, a 10 percent increase in past health contributes to 
approximately 5.percent increase in health in the later period, all things being equal. 
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convenience. The specification of the IV model is analogous to the treatment model.  
Thus the same set of exogenous variable is included in both types of model, and 
insurance non-participation is instrumented two ways, i.e., using the strict identification 
criterion (Model 1), with insurance offer variables only, and then using a fuller 
specification with the full vector of health status covariates (Model 2). 
   Only coefficients of the test variables and test scores, along with their levels of 
significance are included in Table 4. The most important set of results pertains to the 
insurance participation variable. The OLS model serves as a baseline case.  As was 
suspected, OLS underestimates the true effect of having insurance on health. The IV and 
treatment models yield much larger estimates, but are similar to each other (Respectively, 
4.06 and 5.05 in Model 1; 4.07 and 4.70 in Model 2). 
The coefficients of the first-stage residuals in the IV model and the coefficients of 
l in the treatment models are negative, implying that OLS underestimates the effect of 
insurance. Since these coefficients are statistically significant in the first IV model and in 
both treatment models we reject the null hypotheses that the error terms in the two stages 
of the estimation are uncorrelated. However, estimates from IV estimators are always less 
efficient (Vella and Verbeek, 1999). Therefore we refer to the treatment model 
henceforth. Note that we made no a priori conjectures about the direction of the bias. The 
results suggest that the former is the dominant explanation. An alternative explanation is 
related to an unobservable trait, say a propensity to exhibit behaviors consistent with 
moral hazard. This would lead people to choose insurance while reducing preventive 
effort, and hence health status.  
  Although we obtain strong results about the need to correct for endogeneity bias, 
a question may arise regarding the quality of our instruments. The Wald-tests for   24
parameter restrictions that we report in Table 2 indicate that our instruments are jointly 
significant. While it is impossible to test for the correlation between the instruments and 
potentially unobservable characteristics in the health equation, results from the indirect 
test are encouraging. We regressed the health index on the full set of variables, including 
all nine instruments from the first stage. We ran these regressions separately for the 
subsample of the uninsured, the subsample of the insured, as well as for the pooled 
sample. In all of these runs, none of the instrumental variables were significant at the 5% 
significance level, save only the variable, ‘employed’, which designates workers who are 
self-employed or in small firm
10.  One of regional variables, West, was moderately 
significant (10% level) only in the uninsured regression.  The low regional variation in 
health in our sample may not apply to the population overall. While we cannot assert with 
certainty that these variables are uncorrelated with unobservable health status, the results 
from these additional regressions
11 are strongly suggestive of this, at least for the 
particular population in our data.   
  To put the magnitude of the insurance participation effect in perspective we 
calculated the average treatment effects and population effects on health due to providing 
insurance to the previously uninsured, and expressed them in percentage terms.  Using 
OLS and ignoring endogeneity, these are 2.0% and 0.3%. Accounting for endogeneity, 
the effects on health are 7.2% and 1.3% respectively. Thus correcting for the bias 
provides more favorable support in favor of extending insurance coverage to all.   
                                                 
10  In trial regressions we took ‘employed’ out of the first stage, but found virtually no effect on 
the lambdas. Thus we report the original specification. 
 
11  Side regressions are available from the authors upon request.  
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 6.  Results: Chronic Conditions.  
One question that arises is whether health insurance matters more when some medical 
conditions are present, but not others. When recognizable symptoms appear, i.e., a 
medical condition is symptomatic, an individual may seek treatment regardless of 
insurance coverage to relieve pain and suffering. Certain chronic conditions, such as 
diabetes and hypertension are often asymptomatic; the demand for health care services by 
an individual with an asymptomatic condition may be more sensitive to out of pocket 
payments. Thus, we hypothesized that lack of health insurance has a greater adverse 
effect on health (through greater negative effects on health care use) for individuals with 
asymptomatic conditions compared to individuals with symptomatic conditions.    
  To allow for differential effects we replicated the previous analysis for major 
groupings of chronic conditions available in the Health and Retirement Study.  Table 4 
presents regression results for no chronic condition, all major chronic conditions (mainly 
cancer, stroke, heart disease asthma, other upper respiratory illnesses
12 the subset of 
‘asymptomatic’ conditions, i.e. diabetes and hypertension, and for hypertension only.
13  
We do not report results for the subgroup of symptomatic conditions, since the small 
sample size (n= 2,042) resulted in a poor statistical fit. We did not perform separate 
regressions on other individual diagnoses such as cancer or stroke due to small sample 
sizes.  
                                                 
12  Respiratory illnesses include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) or emphysema. 
Cancer may be diagnosed prior to appearance of symptoms, but is classified is a symptomatic 
disease because symptoms would typically appear a short time later.  
 
13 Another common asymptomatic condition, high cholesterol count, was not available from the 
survey. 
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To conserve space and avoid redundancy, first stage insurance participation 
regressions are not presented, as all versions were similar to those for the pooled model 
previously discussed (Table 2). Thus we present only the second-stage health status 
models. Coefficients of risk behavior variables display the familiar pattern whereby 
excessive drinking, smoking, and obesity impact negatively on health. It is striking how 
these effects persist with similar magnitudes for all subgroups. Having a chronic 
condition does not make these effects “worse”, and not having a chronic condition does 
not make these effects less pronounced.  Effects are somewhat less significant in the 
asymptomatic and hypertension groups, probably due to the smaller sample size. Other 
persistent effects that are noteworthy are as follows: education is associated with better 
health outcomes; females exhibit slightly lowered health values.  
  Coefficient of variables of main interest are summarized in Table 6, including a 
comparison of OLS and the treatment effects model for each population. The coefficient 
of insurance participation, which is of greatest interest, is always higher in the treatment 
model. In this sense results for the subgroups are consistent with the results for the pooled 
sample.  Moreover, these coefficients change from being non-significant in the OLS 
models (populations 2-4), to being significant at the 10 percent level in the treatment 
models. The magnitude of the adjusted effect is about the same in all populations. 
However, because the coefficient of lambda (s ts) is non-significant in these models, we 
cannot reject the null hypotheses that the error terms in the two stages of the estimation 
are uncorrelated. By extension we cannot reject OLS unambiguously, although the low 
standard error on the coefficient of the hazard may be due to smaller sample size.    27
Another reason for treating the results with caution is the possibility of errors in self 
reported diagnoses.
14. From inspection of the regression results it is evident the insurance 
effects are of similar magnitudes in all of the sub-samples.  While we cannot be sure that 
we captured relative effects precisely, the results are at least suggestive of there being no 
significant differences by type of chronic condition.   
 
7.  Conclusions  
Previous studies that examined the effect of insurance participation on measures of 
health have found only small effects.  For the most part, these studies did not explicitly 
address the issue of endogeneity bias that arises if the decision to purchase insurance is 
correlated with unobservable traits that may also impact future health. This study 
indicates that adjusting for endogeneity of insurance in health equations in a treatment 
effects or instrumental variable model leads to substantially larger insurance effects 
compared with a more naïve model. It is encouraging that this finding is consistent with 
that of Goldman et al., (2001), even though they examine the endogeneity issue in the 
context of a more specific population, that of AIDS patients, and for a different outcome, 
namely mortality.  
                                                 
14 Underreporting of true medical conditions (i.e., false negative, or Type II errors) may also 
occur in symptomatic conditions, although to a lesser extent than in symptomatic conditions. In 
an interesting and comprehensive study, Baker, Stabile, and Deri (2001) suggest that false 
positive errors may also be high. Using Canadian data they rely on a comparison of self reported 
diagnoses with entries made by physicians in administrative medical records in a prior two-year 
window.  However, the health services research and epidemiological literature caution against 
using administrative medical data as a benchmark, which may be even more prone to error since 
diagnoses are often coded only if relevant to billing. This literature suggests a higher degree of 
specificity in self-reported measures even compared with administrative data complied over long 
period  (e.g., Vargas et al., 1993, Bowlin et al. 1997).  It is not our intension here to side with 
either of these approaches, but rather to suggest that results should be treated with caution.   28
The possibility that insurance effects may have been underestimated in the past              
suggests certain important policy implications. The rising number of the uninsured has 
lead to many proposals to expand options for private insurance coverage. While our 
results do not bear on the efficacy of one policy proposal versus another, they contribute 
to the general debate by showing that insurance participation indeed can result in better 
health, or conversely, that lack of access to health insurance may lead to adverse health 
outcomes. We found that on average, providing insurance to the previously uninsured 
results in a 7 to 8 percent improvement in overall health. The fact that our sample 
consists of working age adults, who are in the pre-Medicare stage of their lives, i.e. ages 
45-64 suggests that one should also weigh the externalities in terms of potential savings 
to the Medicare program from earlier and more effective treatment that would be come 
available for the uninsured. Ultimately policy choices for expanding coverage would 
depend on programmatic costs of expanding coverage, in addition to benefits, but our 
results still make the case for expanded coverage more attractive. It should be noted that 
the Health and Retirement Study does not contain information on the type of plan or the 
generosity of benefits available respondents. This issue should be examined in future 
research.    29
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(S.D.) or % 
Dependent variable 
     
   Health index 1996 
      
 
 
0-100 index of self-reported health status, in 
1996. Based on rankings of overall health, 









     Insurance status 
     
Insurance status as of 1992, dichotomized as 
privately insured or uninsured 




Health Status Equation 
Independent variables (1992) 
      
      Age 















     Race/ethnicity 
           
Binary indicators   1 = white/other 
2 = black 
3 = hispanic 
77.77 
14.34 
  7.89 
 
     Female 
      
Binary indicator   0 = male 




     Marital status 
      
Binary indicator of marital status in 1992  0= not married  
1= married 
17.52 
82.48   
 
     Education  
     
Education in years categorized as follows: less 
than 9, 9-11, high school graduate or equivalent 
(GED), some college (more than 12 years) 
Binary indicators  
1= 0-8 
2= 9-11 







     Income to needs ratio 
           
Ratio of 1992 total household income to 1991 
DHHS poverty guidelines, adjusted for family 
size.   
 
Binary indicators  
1 =  <1.00 
2 = 1.00-1.49 
3 = 1.50-1.99 
4 = 2.00-2.99 
5 = 3.00-4.99 
6 = >or=5.00 
  5.26 
  4.54 





     Smoking status 
     
Self-reported smoking behavior as of 1992 
categorized as never smoked, past smoker and 
current smoker. 
 
1= never  





     Alcohol consumption 
      
Self-reported drinking behavior categorized by 
the number of drinks per day. “Moderate” 
drinking is defined as = 2 drinks; “Heavy” 




3=  heavy 
37.58 
57.56 
  4.86   33
     Body-mass index quintile 
     
Body mass index (BMI) as of 1992 categorized 
by quintile.  This the classic calculation of body 
weight for height, where BMI= kg/m
2. 
 












       (1.45)   
 24.18 
        (0.67) 
26.37 
  (0.62) 
       28.90 
 (0.91) 
34.69 
      (4.41) 
 
     Health index 1992 
      
Control variable for baseline health status in 
1992 















     Employed  Binary indicator  0=unemployed  
1= employed  
26.66 
73.34 
     Employer size 1 
     
Dummy variable for employer size, base on 
number of employees. 
0= all others 




     Employer size 2 
   
Dummy variable for employer size, base on 
number of employees. 





     Employer size 3 
      
 
 Dummy variable for employer size, base on       





      Occupation type.   Binary indicator of professional/management 
Status. 
0=all others 




     Union   Binary indicator of union membership  0= non union 




     Pension Plan       Dummy variable for whether or not the 
respondent has an offer for an employer 
sponsored pension. 





     Region  
      
Geographic region of the United States  1 = northeast 
2 = midwest 
3 = south 




15.90   34
Table 2: Probit Model for Insurance Choice (First Stage Estimates) 
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Income-needs ratio- 1.00-1.49 
 
Income-needs ratio- 1.50-1.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- 2.00-2.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- 3.00-4.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- > =5.00 
 








   .472*** 
(.059) 
   .858*** 
(.064) 








   -.407*** 
(.051) 










   -.455*** 
(.065) 
    .419*** 
(.064) 
   .860*** 
(.071) 








   -.209*** 
(.056) 






   -.141*** 
(.055) 




   .284*** 
(.050) 
   .223*** 
(.092) 
   .580*** 
(.088) 
   .901*** 
(.078) 
   1.205*** 
(.076) 
   1.359*** 
(.078) 
   .403*** 
(.066) 
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Table 2: Probit Model for Insurance Choice (First Stage Estimates) Cont’d 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Note :  * ‡ 90% , < 95% significance   ** ‡ 95%, < 99% significance   ***    ‡ 99% significance 
Education – high school/GED 
 











Wald-test on joint significance 
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Table 3: Health Status Equations 
 












Education - 9-11 years 
 
Education – high school / GED 
 
Education - college 
 
Income-needs ratio- 1.00-1.49 
 
Income-needs ratio- 1.50-1.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- 2.00-2.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- 3.00-4.99 
 








Alcohol - Heavy Drinker 
 
Body mass index - 2 
 









   -1.441*** 
(.377) 




    3.412*** 
(.658) 








  1.873** 
(.862) 
  2.112** 
(.878) 
  -.940** 
(.403) 




  -1.601** 
(.806) 
  -1.242** 
(.537) 







   .955 
(.719) 
   -1.502*** 
(.378) 
   .801* 
(.470) 
   .928 
(.737) 
     2.897*** 
(.705) 
   4.111*** 
(.727) 
   .576 
(1.095) 
   .701 
(1.010) 
    .840 
(1.054) 
   1.571 
(1.092) 
   1.801 
(1.121) 
   -.975** 
(.404) 






  -1.254** 
(.539) 
   -2.252*** 
(.551) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Body mass index - 4 
 
Body mass index - 5 
 






   -2.367*** 
(.549) 
   -5.191*** 
(.566) 
     0.654*** 
(.009) 
   5.054*** 
(1.356) 








   -2.330*** 
(.550) 
   -5.140*** 
(.567) 
     .655*** 
(.008) 
    4.702***  
(1.550) 
   27.128*** 
(2.805) 




















Note :     *        ‡ 90% , < 95% significance 
               **      ‡ 95%, < 99% significance 
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Table 4.   Instrumental Variable (IV) versus Treatment Model: 
Summary of Main Coefficients 
 


















































2  0.492  0.492  0.492  -----  ----- 
Wald c
2    -----  -----  -----      8631.9 
 (d.f. = 25) 
    9943.5 
 (d.f. = 39) 
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Table 5: Treatment Effects Model by Type of Chronic Condition 
 


















Education - 9-11 years 
 
Education – high school / GED 
 
Education - college 
 
Income-needs ratio- 1.00-1.49 
 
Income-needs ratio- 1.50-1.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- 2.00-2.99 
 
Income-needs ratio- 3.00-4.99 
 








Alcohol - Heavy Drinker 
 













  2.036* 
 (1.100) 
     2.697*** 
 (1.028) 



























  1.535 
(1.022) 






    3.203*** 
(.916) 
     4.500*** 
(.946) 










   -1.400*** 
(.541) 
     -4.111*** 
(.608) 
   -.912* 
(.492) 
  -1.232 
(1.056) 















    4.306*** 
(1.138) 
     5.593*** 
(1.176) 










    -1.755*** 
(.680) 
    -4.806*** 
(.790) 
    -1.472** 
(.625) 
   -2.139 
(1.308) 







   2.610* 
(1.367) 






    4.287*** 
(1.202) 
      5.501*** 
(1.238) 










  -1.714** 
(.710) 
     -4.595*** 
(.834) 
   -1.331** 
(.659) 
   -2.481* 
(1.347) 
  -1.677 
(1.205) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 







Body mass index - 3 
 
Body mass index - 4 
 
Body mass index - 5 
 










   -3.328*** 
(.846) 
    .523*** 
(.017) 
   4.537** 
(1.908) 
   39.496*** 
(4.097) 
    -2.195*** 
(.782) 
     -2.315*** 
(.766) 
    -5.197*** 
(.764) 
     .641*** 
(.011) 
     5.056** 
(2.119) 




  -2.031* 
(1.073) 
     -5.093*** 
(1.053) 
     .652*** 
(.014) 
   4.368* 
(2.529) 




  -1.999* 
(1.137) 
      -4.854*** 
(1.118) 
     .656*** 
(.015) 
   4.629* 
(2.611) 



























   
_________________________________ 
Note :   *          ‡ 90% , < 95% significance 
            **        ‡ 95%, < 99% significance 
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Table 6. OLS versus Treatment Models for Specific Chronic Disease Sub-populations. 
 
















































































2  0.287  0.484  0.500  0.498  -----  -----  ------  ----- 
Wald ?
2  ------  -----  -------  -----  1611.9 
(d.f. = 39) 
    6258.7 
 (d.f. = 39) 
4140.9 
(d.f. = 39) 
    3766.6 
 (d.f. = 39) 
N   3,290  5,640  3,598  3,290  3,210  5,640  3,598  3,290 
Notes: Population 1= persons with any of the following chronic diseases: hypertension, diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) or asthma, heart disease, stroke, cancer, arthritis, visual difficulty.  Population 2=persons with asymptomatic diseases: hypertension 
and diabetes.  Population 3= persons with hypertension. 
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Appendix A: Moments of Health Index Distribution 
 
  Health Status by Insurance Status and Survey Wave 
  Uninsured  Insured 
  Wave 1  Wave 3  Wave 1  Wave 3 
Mean  68.7  69.05  77.3  78.6 
St. dev  25.46  25.7  20.39  21.28 
Skewness  -.882  -.827  -1.33  -1.39 
Kurtosis  2.85  2.61  4.53  4.41 
 
 
 